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ANTE-MORTEM PROBATE REVISITED: CAN
AN IDEA HAVE A LIFE AFTER DEATH?
HOWARD FINK*
Foreword-to Bob Wills
In the eleven years I have been at Ohio State, I have had the
good fortune to share the teaching of the Civil Procedure course with
my colleague and friend, Bob Wills. Thus I have been with him for
about a third of his present tenure at the College. What a help he has
been! His encyclopedic knowledge of the cases decided by the Ohio
courts is well known to a generation of students-never once have I
consulted him on a question of Ohio decisional law and come away
empty-handed. Indeed, he usually remembers the volume and page
number of the case in the Ohio Reports! And his familiarity with the
statutes and the literature is equally impressive. Moreover, his coun-
sel has been offered unstintingly in the area of law reform. For exam-
ple, he was a guiding oar in the drafting of the Ohio Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Indeed in writing the following article I have turned to Bob again
and again. His command of Ohio probate law is complete. Further,
he recalled that ante-mortem probate was a subject much discussed
when he was a law student, and gave me citations which led me to
that earlier discussion.**
But over the years Bob's contributions have gone well beyond
that of teaching and reform of the law. I have worked with Bob on
the College's admissions program and on our various reappraisals of
the College's grading system. His application of statistical methods
and computer theory is the underpinning of what I believe to be one
of the fairest systems of admissions and grading of any law school in
the country. Under his influence, we have tried mightily to avoid
disadvantaging an applicant because of the humbleness of his origins
or for his lack of influential proponents. And once the student is
* Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law. Copyright © Howard
Fink.
** I would like also to acknowledge the suggestions made by my colleague Prof. Robert
J. Lynn, who carefully read the manuscript for this article-as it happens, he also was my
teacher in Estates II, where he contributed greatly to my basic knowledge of the subject. And
I would like to thank Robert W. Trafford, managing editor of the Law Journal, for valuable
research assistance.
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admitted, the system Bob was instrumental in creating seeks to avoid
inequity in grading because of the instructor to whom he is assigned.
None of our colleagues has been more unsparing of his own time
or effort in the College's educational mission than Bob Wills. It is
this selflessness coupled with unremitting optimism that has so en-
deared him to his fellow teachers and to his students for the past three
decades.
I.
Practitioners have often been asked whether there was not some
way absolutely to assure that a testator's will can be admitted to
probate without successful challenge on the basis of lack of testamen-
tary capacity, undue influence or lack of compliance with the statutes
relating to the validity of wills (as opposed to the success of a specific
bequest-which might be affected by changing circumstances). News
items regularly appear describing challenges to the wills of wealthy
individuals who have left large bequests-often to charitable founda-
tions, churches, hospitals or to individuals particularly deserving in
the eyes of the testator, but not, in the eyes of the challengers, "the
natural object of one's bounty."' Often, in such cases, long-lost rela-
I See, e.g., New York Times Feb. 7, 1965, at 3, col. 6. ("California Ruling Costs Italian
Town $100,000 .... John Nigro, a cobbler who died in March 1963, directed in his will that
the $100,000 estate he had amassed in this country be used for building a hospital in his native
town of Grimaldi. He disinherited his only close survivor, his son, Frank, of Kansas City. Frank
contested the will in Los Angeles Superior Court, arguing that his father was incompetent when
he wrote the will. His father was irrational and under psychiatric care, the son, now 40, testified.
Yesterday the court agreed with the son. Grimaldi lost. The full estate, it was ordered, goes to
Frank Nigro."); New York Times, Nov. 15, 1961, at 45, col. 3. ("Court Upholds Bequest to
Foster Vocal Music . . . . A will bequeathing a $228,000 estate to the state to promote vocal
music and 'develop the lungs of children' was upheld today by the Iowa Supreme Court.
William Elisha Hawks, a Cambridge bachelor left his entire estate to the Iowa State Public
School Fund . . . . Mr. Hawks had no brothers or sisters, but two Des Moines cousins, Mrs.
Dora Eckles and Mrs. Myrtle Ross, contested the will."); New York Times, March 14, 1958,
at 50, col. 3. ("Will Dispute Settled. Immigrant's $150,000 Goes to Helpful Ex-Shoeshine
Boy"): New York Times, Aug. 13, 1958, at 29, col. 2. ("Connecticut Bars Ouija-Board Will");
New York Times, April 6, 1957, at 16, col. 6. ("Jury Denies Waiter Bequest of $700,000");
New York Times, Jan. 21, 1948, at 20, col. I. ("Aged Testator Held Sane. Witnesses to the
will of Balint Medgysey, 80-year-old furrier, who died surrounded by junk in his two-room cold
water flat . . . testified in Surrogate's Court . . . that the aged furrier was of sound mind last
May 14, when he bequeathed all but $2,000 of his $54,000 estate to the State of New York in
gratitude for his opportunity to earn a living here . . . . Louis H. Cioffi, who was appointed
special guardian by Surrogate William T. Collins to protect the interests of unknown infants
or incompetents, reported that he was making a search for a niece, Irma Balogh of Matezalka,
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tives appear and threaten a challenge, securing a settlement that
reduces the value of the original bequests.2
Presently there are available some devices for the testator who
seeks to weight the scales in favor of the validity of his will. The in
terrorem clause in a will threatens beneficiaries with loss of their
bequests should they unsuccessfully challenge the validity of the
will.3 The testator can, in many states, perpetuate his testimony and
that of other persons asserting his testamentary capacity and freedom
from undue influence.4 He may also make use of the self-proved will,
whereby he attaches his affidavit and that of its witnesses to the will
swearing that he was free from undue influence and of sound mind
when he signed his will.5
But even these devices assume a future will contest, after the
testator has died and is no longer available to provide first-hand
evidence of his mental stability and his freedom from influence-and
unable to correct any mistakes in the drawing or witnessing of the
will. This article will explore a suggested alternative-a state statute
providing for a declaratory judgment as to the validity of a will and
the capacity of its maker, to be brought by the testator himself,
against all those who would, upon the testator's death, be able to
challenge the will. The proceeding would take place while the testator
is alive and able to testify, not by deposition but in direct view of the
court or jury which would determine his capacity and his freedom
from influence and which would decide if the will were properly
drawn and witnessed. These findings would be binding upon all those
validly made parties to the action or represented in the action, by
operation of the doctrines of collateral estoppel, res judicata, and
virtual representation. If the technical execution of the will were
found wanting, it could be corrected, rather than having the issue
arise after the testator's death when a flaw in the execution of the will
Hungary, and Joseph Balogh of Satu Mare, Rumania, who might possibly contest the will of
their aged uncle.").
2 See, e.g., the Wendel case, discussed in the New York Times, Mar. 24, 1931, at I, col.
3, and in Cavers, Ante Mortem Probate: An Essay in Preventive Law, I U. CHI. L. REV. 440,
443 (1933).
1 But the in terrorem clause is often narrowly construed or even disallowed in many
jurisdictions. 5 PAGE ON WILLS § 44.29 (Bowe-Parker Rev. 1962).
See, e.g., OHIO R. Civ. P. 27, based in part on the UNIFORM PERPETUATION OF TESTI-
MONY Acr § 1 (1949).
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-504 (1972). But the "self-proved" will must be probated
and can be challenged on the grounds of capacity and freedom from influence. Thus it "proves"
nothing. It merely sets up a rebuttable presumption of validity.
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would result in its failure, with intestate succession being the only
alternative under state law.
Of course, many questions must be answered with regard to such
a statute before a state legislature would adopt it. The exploration
of these questions is important for two reasons-one, it will help us
in determining the viability of such a statute. Second, the exploration
is instructive to an understanding of modern concepts of the jurisdic-
tion of courts to settle disputes between potential adverse parties.
Some of these questions are:
1. Would such a statute be constitutionally valid, particularly
with regard to nonresident beneficiaries? What is the due process
effect of attempting to bind potential challengers-both those named
in the will and those left out-some of whom may not reside in the
state, others who may have undetermined future interests, and others
whose whereabouts are unknown?
2. Does such an action present a justiciable controversy?
3. Would such a procedure undesirably interfere with family
relationships to a greater extent than do present will contests? Would
it be an undue strain on the probate court?
When the idea first occurred to me (in the process of preparing
an examination in my civil procedure course), it immediately raised
two questions. First, since the idea seemed so simple and straightfor-
ward, why was it not thought of by many others before me-was
there something I did not understand about the probate process (a
field foreign to my own) that would automatically rule out its practi-
cality or validity? Second, if it had been advocated before, why had
it not taken hold? I discussed the idea with a number of practitioners,
teachers and judges in the probate field, and they thought it had
merit, though applicable only to a limited class of cases. Research
turned up no similar statutes presently on the books of any state. The
current treatises treat the subject briefly, and with little interest.' But
the search led me to a 1933 article, Professor David F. Cavers' Ante
Mortem Probate: An Essay in Preventive Law.7 Cavers was com-
menting in part on a statute which had been adopted by the Michigan
legislature in 1883, and which in turn had been struck down by the
O See, e.g., P. MECHEM AND J. ATKINSON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON TIlE LAW
OF WILLS ADMINISTRATION 540 (4th ed. 1954); 3 PAGE ON WILLS § 26.25 (Bowe-Parker Rev.
1961), (but more sympathetic to the idea than others); T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK ON THlE LAW
OF WILLS 484-85 (2d ed. 1953).
1 Cavers, supra note 2.
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Michigan Supreme Court in 1885, largely on the ground that ante-
mortem probate was beyond judicial competence. In many ways the
Michigan statute was similar to the one I had envisioned, but with
some features that were quite different. When it was interred by the
Michigan court, that apparently was the last of state attempts to
provide such a proceeding. Yet knowing that the idea had appealed
to one distinguished legislature gave me confidence to continue the
exploration of the course I had independently begun.
II.
Let us first examine the complete text of the Michigan Act of
1883, set out in the note below.8 Section 1 provides for a petition
1883 Mich. Pub. St. 17. The text of the Act of 1883 is found in Note, 24 AM. L. REG.
(N.S.) 794 (1885) and reads as follows:
Sect. 1. The people of the state of Michigan enact, that to any will heretofore
or hereafter executed, the testator may make and annex his petition to be sworn to
before and presented to the judge of probate for the county where the testator resides,
asking that such will be admitted and established as his last will and testament.
Sect. 2. Every such petition shall contain averments that such will was duly
executed by the petitioner without fear, fraud, impartiality, or undue influence, and
with a full knowledge of its contents, and that the testator is of sound mind and
memory and full testamentary capacity and shall state the names and addresses of
every person who at the time of making and filing the same would be interested in
the estate of the maker of such will as heir if such maker should at the making of
such petition become deceased, and may also contain the names and addresses of
any other persons whom such testator may desire to make parties to such proceed-
ings.
Sect. 3. Such judge of probate shall thereupon, upon request of such testator,
appoint a time for the hearing of such petition and issue citations to the parties
named in such petition, and direct published notice of such hearing, and have such
hearing, after proof of service of citations and of publication of notice, in the manner,
as near as practicable, as is required for the probate of wills.
Sect. 4. If any person named in such petition shall be a minor, or otherwise
under disability, a guardian ad litem shall be appointed by such judge to represent
such person. On such hearing such judge of probate shall examine into the matters
alleged in such petition, and into the testamentary capacity of such testator. and
examine witnesses in relation thereto, and if it shall appear that the allegations of
such petition are true, and that said testator was of sound mind and memory and
full testamentary capacity, such judge shall make a decree thereon, and shall cause
a copy of such decree to be attached to said will, certified under the seal of said court,
decreeing that the testator, at the making of such will and such petition, was pos-
sessed of sound mind and memory, and full testamentary capacity, and that said will
was executed without fear, fraud, impartiality or undue influence, which decree shall
have the same effect as if made by said court after the death of the testator on the
probate of such will, and such will having been so established shall not be set aside
or impeached on the grounds of insanity or want of testamentary capacity on the
part of the testator, or that the same was executed through fear, fraud, impartiality,
or undue influence.
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asking the probate court "that such will be admitted and established
as his last will and testament." That language could create confusion
as to the effect of the procedure. What does "admitted" mean? Ob-
viously the testator's estate is not being taken into the court's custody
at that point. Nor is there a mechanism set out for determining that
this is testator's last will and testament. Section 2 provides, in addi-
tion to testator's stating that the will is not being executed under
undue influence-a self-serving statement at bestg-that he
state the names and addresses of every person who at the time of
making and filing the same would be interested in the estate of the
maker of such will as heir if such maker should at the making of
such petition become deceased [sic], and may also contain the
names and addresses of any other persons whom such testator may
desire to make parties to such proceedings."0
The Supreme Court of Michigan construed the first part of this
language as not providing for notice to the wife of the testator; pre-
sumably she was not considered to be included in those who would
take as heir if the testator died intestate.
The broad proviso allowing the addition of the names of any
other persons "whom such testator may desire to make parties to
such proceedings" gave rise to the possibility that some parties
named by the testator might have no legally discernable interest in
the proceedings, and therefore no standing to raise the crucial issue
of testamentary capacity; others who would have such interest might
not be named and therefore not bound by the proceedings.
The Act provided for proof of service of the citations upon those
named parties and for publication of notice of the hearing. 2 Presuma-
bly this meant service within the state upon resident parties and
service by publication upon nonresidents.
After a hearing upon the allegations of testamentary capacity, a
decree was to be entered by the judge that would have the same effect
Sect. 5. Appeals shall be in the same manner as from probate of wills.
Sect. 6. Nothing in this act contained shall be construed to prevent the revoca-
tion of such will, or alteration or other change thereof, as in ordinary wills.
In this the procedure resembles the "self-proved" will, discussed supra at note 5.
20 Section 2 of the 1883 Michigan Act, set out supra note 8 (emphasis added).
" Lloyd v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 56 Mich. 236, 23 N.W. 28 (1885). The language of the
Act of 1883, the text of which is recorded in Note, 24 AM. L. REG. (N.S.) 794 (1885), is quite
unclear on this point. At least by modern statute, a surviving spouse is considered to be an heir.
See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-201(17) (1972).
12 Section 3 of the Act of 1883, set out supra note 8.
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as if it were determined subsequent to the testator's death.13 But then
the Act went on to state that noihing therein should prevent a later
revocation or alteration of the will,1" which would make the findings
of the court on previous testamentary capacity nugatory.
In Lloyd v. Wayne Circuit Judge,15 the testator had presented his
will for probate under the 1883 Michigan statute. The will had ex-
cluded one son and the testator's wife. The probate judge dismissed
the proceeding on the ground that the Act was unconstitutional, prin-
cipally because it failed to make provision for notice to the wife. On
review, two opinions were filed by the Supreme Court of Michigan,
each concurred in by the same two other justices of the court. The
first, by Chief Justice Cooley, stressed the lack of joinder of the
testator's wife, who was a necessary party to the action, but also
added doubt that the proceeding envisioned by the 1883 statute was
a "judicial proceeding, and the order made thereupon a judicial judg-
ment." The other opinion, by Justice Campbell, turned on the second
issue, that the proceeding envisioned was beyond judicial competence.
Justice Campbell said:
The case is one where we can get no help from similar preced-
ents, as the statute is new and singular. Judicial proceedings to
probate a will while the testator is living, are unheard of in this
country or in England; and inasmuch as the statute only makes the
decree effective in the single case of the establishment of the will and
subsequent death without revocation or alteration, and leaves it
open to the testator to make any subsequent arrangement which he
may desire, or to oust the jurisdiction by change of residence, or to
leave the will once rejected open to probate in the usual way after
death, the proceeding is still more anomalous. I am disposed to
think, with the circuit judge, that this is not in any sense a judicial
proceeding which he was bound to consider or entertain.
The broadest definition ever given to the judicial power con-
fines it to controversies between conflicting parties in interest, and
such can never be the condition of a living man and his possible
heirs. Our statutes have never undertaken, and do not in this case
undertake, to give to the heirs any interest which will ever be fixed
by this probate, or which may not be cut off at any time by their
own death, or by relator by new will or conveyance. It is by no
13 Section 4 of the Act of 1883, set out supra note 8.
" Section 6 of the Act of 1883, set out supra note 8.
" 56 Mich. 236, 23 N.W. 28 (1885).
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means free from doubt what classes of probate proceedings under
our system are to be treated as judicial proceedings in the proper
sense of that term; and it is not important here to consider that
question, because this proceeding is not even a suit for probate.
There has never been any proceeding known to our laws for the
mere purpose of establishing the will even of a deceased person. The
probate of wills under our statutes is merely a part of the proceed-
ings to administer the estates of deceased persons in the court that
has jurisdiction and charge of such estates. This rule is so general
that in some states devises are not probated at all, and in some the
probate is not conclusive, because controversies concerning land are
usually tried in other courts. We have enlarged the jurisdiction in
probate so as to reach lands for some purposes, and have made all
wills subject to probate. But there is no case where an original
probate can be granted here, except in the court having jurisdiction
over the estate; it cannot be done separately. This statute does not
attempt to change the place of ultimate probate, and it does not
make a decree against the will either a bar or even admissible to
prevent future probate after death. It makes no provision for mak-
ing a finding either way evidence for any purpose during testator's
life, so as to negative testamentary capacity, or otherwise to affect
him. And it has no force for any purpose so long as he lives. 6
Several factors may have motivated the decision. First, this ini-
tial case reaching the state supreme court was a classic case of a man
disinheriting the "natural objects of his bounty"-his wife and son.
Second, the wife was not even notified of the proceeding. Third, the
court was suspicious of the nature of the proceeding, although it
recognized the evil it was intended to remedy. Stated Justice Camp-
bell:
This statute, which was probably designed to prevent the un-
seemly and disgraceful attempts, too often made, to defeat the en-
forcement of the last will of persons whose competency to deal with
their own affairs was never doubted or interfered with, has been so
drawn as to remove none of the difficulties, but rather to make them
worse. It is a singular, and in my judgment, a very unfortunate
spectacle to see a man compelled to enter upon a contest with the
hungry expectants of his own estate, and litigate while living with
those who have no legal claims whatever upon him, but who may
subject him to ruinous costs and delays in meeting such testimony
as is apt to be paraded in such cases. The practice which has usually
"1 56 Mich. at 240, 23 N.W. at 29.
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prevailed in civil-law countries, and also is said to have been cus-
tomary in various parts of England, (see Seld. Ecc. Jur. Test. 5) of
having wills executed or declared in solemn form, or acknowledged
before reputable officers and a sufficient number of disinterested
witnesses to render it unlikely that the testator is not acting with
capacity and freedom, has been approved by the continued experi-
ence of most countries, and has saved them from the post mortem
squabblings and contests on mental condition which have made a
will the least secure of all human dealings, and made it doubtful
whether in some regions insanity is not accepted as the normal
condition of testators. 7
But was not the court letting its views of the wisdom of the statute
color the determination of its validity?
III.
Lloyd v. Wayne Circuit Judge must be understood in terms of
the time it was handed down, and the court which decided it. The
Michigan court of that era narrowly construed judicial power in the
context of the separation between the legislative and judicial branches
that is required by typical state constitutional language. In Anway v.
Grand Rapids Ry. Co.,'" decided thirty-five years after Lloyd v.
Wayne Circuit Judge, the Michigan Supreme Court became the first
state high court to consider a state declaratory judgment statute, and
held the Michigan declaratory judgment act to be unconstitutional
under state constitutional separation-of-powers provisions.'9
Anway could have been decided on its facts without striking
down the declatory judgment act-it was seemingly a poor vehicle for
determining the act's validity. The bill had alleged that plaintiff was
employed by defendant street railway and that he desired to work
more than six days in any consecutive seven days; he did not allege
he had any contract to do so or that defendant had committed any
wrong upon him or threatened to do so; rather it seems that both
plaintiff and defendant wanted to know whether a seven-day week
violated state protective labor legislation. The supreme court could
readily have held that this was a feigned case, that there was no real
dispute between the parties, but rather that the real dispute was be-
tween the plaintiff and his employer on the one hand and the state
,7 56 Mich. at 241, 23 N.W. at 30.
,8 211 Mich. 592, 179 N.W. 350 (1920). See Annot., 12 A.L.R. 26 (1920).
"1 See 6A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 57.03 (1974).
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on the other. Even under today's declaratory judgment acts, a genu-
ine dispute of an adversary character must exist:" there must be the
threat of harm befalling one of the parties if the other carries out a
threatened course of conduct,2 ' and each must have a legal position
adverse to the other on the salient questions. 2 But instead of resting
the case on these narrow grounds, the court seemed to go out of its
way to reach the constitutional issue that it need not have faced.
The court implied that to employ the state judicial system to
advise parties who had not yet acted detrimentally toward each other
of their legal rights carried the taint of communism. 3 Focusing on
the straw man it had set up with the decidedly hypothetical case
before it, the court brought down the entire statute. It held:
While the advocates of this measure insist that the proceedings
authorized by the act do not constitute a moot case, and while the
proceedings may not square in all particulars with the technical
definition of a moot case, they are such in every essential. The act
contemplates determinations of abstract propositions of law before
any cause of action has accrued or before any wrong has been
committed, or before any damages have been occasioned or threat-
ened; it does not contemplate final process to put the determination
of the court into force unless there be a further proceeding on appli-
cation by petition.24
The court cited numerous previous cases from many jurisdictions, but
20 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Iron Co., 312 U.S. 270 (1941); Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937); Annot., 108 A.L.R. 100 (1937); 6A J.
MoORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 57.12 (1974).
21 MOORE, supra note 19, at 57.05.
2 Id. at 1 57.12, 57.15.
21 We note that the learned professor, who is so frequently quoted, entertains
the view that it is the duty of the state through its courts to furnish advice to its
citizens rather than to leave them to 'unauthorative advice of counsel.' This adopts
the view that 'the state is everything, the individual nothing.' Under our government
the state does not till our farms, manufacture our automobiles, conduct our great
department stores, or do our law business for us. The unfortunate people of one
country are at present trying such experiment in government. We are still a govern-
ment of laws, operating under a written Constitution, and to it rather than to the
question of desirability we must look for our power. If such power as we are here
asked to exercise under this act is wanting in the Constitution, then this court lacks
such power, and the Legislature lacks authority to grant it.
Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry. Co., 211 Mich. 592, 597, 179 N.W. 350, 352 (1920).
The learned professor quoted in the briefs to whom the court refers is undoubtedly Prof.
Edward Borchard; see, e.g., Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment-A Needed Procedural
Reform, 28 YALE LJ. I (1918).
24 Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry. Co., 211 Mich. 592, 605, 179 N.W. 350, 355 (1920).
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the decision upon which it relied most heavily, which it said was
entirely controlling, was none other than Lloyd v. Wayne Circuit
Judge.2 Thus it is clear that the Michigan court believed that the
same reasoning which prevented state courts from rendering declara-
tory judgments prevented those courts from determining the validity
of a will prior to the death of the testator.
Still more years passed. Other states endorsed the concept of the
declaratory judgment. Ultimately even the Michigan Supreme Court
upheld a declaratory judgment statute," worded slightly differently
than that which had been struck down in Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry.
Co. Later still, the United States Supreme Court accepted the con-
cept of the declaratory judgment for the federal courts,21 after first
rejecting the idea.28 But by then the concept of ante-mortem probate
was virtually forgotten. The idea was discarded, even though the
philosophical underpinning of the opinion striking it down was itself
undermined by these later developments.
IV.
The following model declaratory judgment statute would remedy
some of the weaknesses of the Michigan statute and would incorpo-
rate jurisdictional concepts that have been developed in recent years.
Declaratory Judgment as To Validity of Wills
and Testamentary Capacity
A person who executes a will [testator] disposing of his estate
in conformity with the statutes of [this state] may institute a pro-
ceeding for a judgment declaring the validity of the will as to the
signature on the will, required number of witnesses to the signature
and their signatures, and the testamentary capacity and freedom
from undue influence of the person executing his will. Any benefici-
ary named in the will and all of testator's present intestate succes-
sors shall be named parties to the proceeding. Service of process
may be made in any county in [this state] upon a party who is an
inhabitant of or is found within the state. Upon a party who is not
an inhabitant of or found within the state, service may be made by
mailing a copy of the summons and complaint to the party at his
last known address by registered mail. Upon parties whose ad-
" 211 Mich. at 621, 179 N.W. at 360.
25 Washington-Detroit Theatre Co. v. Moore, 249 Mich. 673, 229 N.W. 618 (1930). See
Annot., 68 A.L.R. 105 (1930).
2 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1931).
28 Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Asso., 277 U.S. 274 (1928).
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dresses are unknown, or whose interest under the will, or in the
estate of the testator should the will be declared to be invalid, is
presently unascertainable, service may be made by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation published in plaintiff's county in
accordance with the statutes of [this state].
If the court finds that the will has been properly executed and
that the plaintiff has the requisite testamentary capacity and free-
dom from undue influence, it shall declare the will valid and order
it placed on file with the court. The will shall be binding in this state
unless and until plaintiff executes a new will and institutes a new
proceeding under this section naming the appropriate parties to the
new proceeding as well as the parties to any former declaratory
action plaintiff has brought under this statute.
The facts found in a proceeding brought under this section shall
not be admissible in evidence in any proceeding other than one
brought in this state to determine the validity of a will; nor shall the
determination in a proceeding under this section be binding upon
the parties to such a proceeding in any action not brought to deter-
mine the validity of a will.
Several salient differences between this proposed statute and the
former Michigan statute can be seen. First, the proposed statute is
cast in terms of a declaratory judgment, utilizing a concept that has
been broadly accepted in this country, but which was virtually un-
known at the time of the Michigan Act. In addition to testamentary
capacity, the proposed statute would deal also with the related issue
of freedom from undue influence, and with the question of compli-
ance by the testator with the technical requirements of state law for
the making of a will-the required number of witnesses, notarization
if necessary, and any similar duties imposed by law.
Parties to the action contemplated under the proposed statute
would be all those named as beneficiaries in the will and all those who
would take by intestate succession should the will be declared invalid
and the testator die presently. Presumably, all these persons would
have standing to raise the issues regarding the validity of testator's
will. The question of how remote, contingent takers could be pro-
tected might be covered in the statute by appropriate language, but I
believe that on the narrow issues with which the statute is concerned,
e.g. testamentary capacity and freedom from undue influence, the
interests of remote and possibly unborn takers by intestate succession
would usually coincide with the interests pressed by present takers;
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thus the doctrine of "virtual representation" would ordinarily protect
future takers.2 1 Of course, for the doctrine of virtual representation
to protect unborn or unascertained future takers, there must be some
persons before the court who would take by intestate succession if the
will were to be declared invalid; otherwise a guardian ad litem must
be appointed to protect such interests. Obviously the interests of
takers by intestate succession are not protected by the presence of
named beneficiaries whose interests lie in upholding the will.
Next, the proposed statute provides for service of process on the
named parties, both within and without the state, by a method of
service reasonably calculated to give actual notice and an opportunity
to appear and defend, which are requisites of due process of law.'"
Service on out-of-state parties under the Michigan statute was by
publication. This type of service was held to be inadequate as to
persons whose interest is presently ascertainable and whose address
is presently known, in Mullane V. Central Hanover Bank and Trust
Co. 31
If the court, under the proposed statute, determines that the will
is valid, that the testator had sufficient testamentary capacity, and
was free of undue influence, a judgment would be entered. Unlike the
earlier Michigan procedure, the will would then be placed on file with
the court. There could be no valid will discovered after death, since
to change the will would require a new proceeding brought by the
testator and the new will being filed with the court. This would not
be as cumbersome as it might at first seem, since a consent judgment
could ordinarily be entered into.
Of course there might be the risk that disgruntled losers of the
former judgment would threaten to drag the testator through re-
peated court battles every time he wanted to change his will. But there
are answers to this. First, the testator could refrain from changing
the will. The original will could be drawn flexibly enough to antici-
pate changed circumstances without the need for a new will. And, to
' See Roberts, Virtual Representation in Actions Affecting Future Interests, 30 ILL. L.
REV. 580, 581 (1936). "The doctrine of virtual representation is based upon the theory that there
is some party before the court whose interests in the issue to be decided are so identical with,
or so closely similar to, the interests of the absent person, that in protecting his own interests
the representative party will bring forward such matter and take such action that, as a necessary
by-product, the court will have before it an adequate presentation of the interests which the
absent person has in common with him.", citing Bennett v. Fleming, 105 Ohio St. 352, 361,
137 N.E. 900, 902 (1922). The doctrine was applied by the court in Matthies v. Seymour Mfg.
Co., 270 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. den. 361 U.S. 962 (1960).
" See text at note 35, infra.
31 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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the extent that issues which had been determined in a prior
declaratory proceeding would arise in a subsequent one, the former
findings would be controlling upon the same parties who had pre-
viously litigated the issues, by the doctrine of res judicata or collateral
estoppel.12 And the former losers would be subject to the expenses
of further litigation as well. Moreover, perhaps there could be some
statutory method provided for making minor changes that would not
again raise the issue of testamentary capacity or undue influence.
Finally, the proposed statute provides that facts found in a pro-
ceeding under the statute are not admissible in evidence in actions
other than for the determination of the validity of a will, and that the
determination in such a statutory proceeding shall not be binding for
collateral estoppel purposes upon the parties in other actions not
involving the determination of the validity of a will. Without these
provisos, a testator might fear that by instituting a proceeding to
determine his testamentary capacity he runs the risk that an unfavor-
able verdict or unfavorable findings could be detrimental (or even
determinative) in a future proceeding testing his mental capacity.
V.
Two constitutional issues, one based on the typical state consti-
tution and one based on the fourteenth amendment to the Federal
Constitution, would likely be raised by parties opposed to a statute
such as the one I have proposed.
First, is a proceeding under such a statute within the judicial
power of a state court in a state that has a typical separation of
judicial and legislative powers doctrine in its constitution? Does it, in
other words, involve a justiciable controversy, rather than a feigned
or hypothetical case? I would suggest that such a proceeding would
be as much within judicial power as is an ordinary declaratory judg-
ment. Lloyd v. Wayne Circuit Judge held that a state court could not
determine the testamentary capacity of a living testator because there
is no judicially cognizable conflict between "a living man and his
possible heirs." Perhaps that holding was affected by the belief that
a determination under the Michigan statute would not be definitive,
since regardless of the finding, the will could be changed. The statute
I propose would contain a provision that the will would be binding if
the requisites of validity were found13 as well as a registration provi-
11 Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876).
13 The effect of a finding that the will was invalid is more conjectural. Of course if the
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sion which would put the will in the files of the probate court and
require that any revised will be subjected to a similar judicial determi-
nation of testamentary capacity, freedom from undue influence and
compliance with the technical requirements for making a valid will.
Thus a determination would have the indicia of finality necessary for
a judicial rather than an advisory determination.
Also, would there be a genuine dispute among potential takers
by intestate succession, beneficiaries under a will, and the testator
himself as to his testamentary capacity and freedom from undue
influence prior to his or her death? Some would say that until the
testator dies, the situation is fluid and mutable-the estate may or
may not exist when the testator dies, he may or may not reside in
the same state at the time of death. But although the estate is not
being distributed in the proceeding to determine his capacity and
independence from undue influence, there are genuine issues about
which these parties could strongly disagree. And these issues are
being determined as finally as they would be in any declaratory judg-
ment proceeding.
To some extent, all declaratory judgments deal with hypothetical
and mutable situations. For example, suppose there is a patent licens-
ing agreement and the licensee seeks a declaratory judgment that it
need no longer pay royalties. Had it not brought the action, and had
it nevertheless ceased royalty payments, it may or may not have been
sued by the licensor. Perhaps, though threatening an action, the licen-
sor might not have sued for fear that if it were unsuccessful, an
unfavorable determination could be used against it by other licensees
in subsequent actions under modern principles of collateral estop-
pel.34 'Or two parties to a contract might get into a heated dispute
as to its meaning and a declaratory judgment suit might be brought.
No matter how the action comes out, the parties might, on the day
after the judgment, abrogate the contract and enter into a new
agreement. Or a person may be threatening to erect a building which
finding is based on the lack of the proper witnessing, or the signature, this could readily be
solved by redrafting the will and having it properly signed and witnessed. Independence of
previous undue influence might be harder to establish in a subsequent proceeding. It is, of
course, difficult to prove that a former undue influence has abated. It may be that the testator
can never be free of the former dominance and either his estate would be subject to intestate
succession or be controlled by an earlier will. On the other hand, even lack of testamentary
capacity might improve with psychiatric treatment.
3 Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 406 U.S. 313
(1971).
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plaintiff, in a declaratory judgment proceeding, alleges will encroach
upon his property. Had there been no declaratory judgment proceed-
ing, or even if there is one and plaintiff loses, the court cannot be
certain that the building will ever be erected. Or, where an insurer
sues to determine that it need not pay disability benefits to a defen-
dant, even if the defendant wins he might immediately regain his
health, or he may die, precluding any actual payments. So there is
always a conjectural element to a declaratory judgment proceeding,
since harm has not yet befallen the plaintiff, and may never do so,
no matter how the declaratory action comes out. But so long as there
is an actual dispute between the parties that could lead to harm if the
threats were carried out, a federal or a state court can hear a declara-
tory judgment action.
Thus it ought to follow that the fact the testator might actually
die penniless, or that his present intestate successors may predecease
him, or that he may be domiciled in another state at the time of his
death, or that he might change his will, should not preclude a pro-
ceeding to determine several very narrow issues about which there
can be a genuine, present, factual dispute. Of course all the parties
to such a proceeding would not share the same view of testator's
capacity and freedom from dominance and of the validity of the will.
They could be aligned in the litigation according to their positions on
the issues.
Surely it would seem that the state ought to be able to conclude
that a testator has sufficient interest in seeing that his estate goes to
the takers he has designated-the raison d'etre of having a system of
probate and estate distribution-that he could initiate such an action.
After that, the parties would be aligned according to the position they
take, for or against the success of the will. Thus a third requisite of
a declaratory action-adverse parties as well as a genuine dispute
leading to a final judgment-would be met by a state procedure which
determined capacity, freedom from undue influence and the compli-
ance of the will with legal requirements while the maker of the will
is still alive and can supply the best evidence on these issues and can
correct any deficiencies which are found.
A second constitutional issue, under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and analo-
gous state constitutional language, would be whether a person named
in a proceeding to determine testamentary capacity, and related is-
sues, could refuse to appear in the proceeding and nonetheless bring
an action after the testator's death to redetermine the issues which
37 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 264 (1976)
were found in the earlier proceeding. The answer would seem to lie
within the parameters of two widely cited decisions of the United
States Supreme Court. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and
Trust Co.,35 the Supreme Court upheld a state statute that in many
ways resembled the law which is herein proposed. In Mullane, the
State of New York had provided that trust companies could
establish common trust funds, merging small trust funds (of which
they are trustees) only for investment purposes to get economies of
scale in applying investment advice. Each fund would share ratably
in the common fund in proportion to the ratio of its size to that of
the entire fund. The problem was that a number of the beneficiaries
of the funds were not residents of New York. Could they be served
outside the state, by a means of process reasonably calculated to
give actual notice, and be bound by the determination in a proceed-
ing to accept the accounts of the trustee? Indeed they could, held
the Court.
Judicial proceedings to settle fiduciary accounts have been
sometimes termed in rem, or more indefinitely quasi in rem, or
more vaguely still, "in the nature of a proceeding in rem." It is not
readily apparent how the courts of New York did or would classify
the present proceeding, which has some characteristics and is want-
ing in some features of proceedings both in rem and in personam.
But in any event we think that the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution do not depend upon a
classification for which the standards are so elusive and confused
generally and which, being primarily for state courts to define, may
and do vary from state to state. Without disparaging the usefulness
of distinctions between actions in rem and those in personam in
many branches of law, or on other issues, or the reasoning which
underlies them, we do not rest the power of the State to resort to
constructive service in this proceeding upon how its courts or this
Court may regard this historic antithesis. It is sufficient to observe
that, whatever the technical definition of its chosen procedure, the
interest of each state in providing means to close trusts that exist
by the grace of its laws and are administered under the supervision
of its courts is so insistent and rooted in custom as to establish
beyond doubt the right of its courts to determine the interests of all
claimants, resident or nonresident, provided its procedure accords
full opportunity to appear and be heard.3
339 U.S. 306 (1950).
339 U.S. at 312.
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It would thus appear that the dominant factor for the Court was
not the characterization of the proceeding to close the trustee's ac-
counts as in personam, quasi in rem, or in rem, but rather the state's
interest in providing a reasonable means to give to the beneficiaries
of trusts and the trust companies that manage them the economic
benefits of a pooling arrangement so long as a reasonable opportunity
to be heard was afforded the beneficiaries prior to accepting the
trustees' accounts.
So too, a state may have an interest in providing to testators
assurance that the disposition of their estates which they envisioned
in their will shall not founder because of technical mistakes or argu-
ments about testamentary capacity and related issues arising at a
time when no absolute proof is possible and mistakes cannot be
corrected. There is a further state policy basis for such proceed-
ings-to prevent fraudulent claims to an estate from being asserted
on the threat of challenging the will, in the hope that a settlement will
be given by those named in the will, often hospitals, foundations or
other charitable institutions. In this the interest would resemble that
of the state in discouraging "strike" suits by putting limitations upon
the bringing of shareholders' derivative actions."
But another widely studied Supreme Court case might be sug-
gested as pointing in the opposite direction to Mullane. In Hanson
v. Denckla,31 the Court held that a Florida court violated due process
of law by determining rights to the proceeds of a Delaware trust when
the Delaware trustee, which was considered to be an indispensable
party under Florida law, could not be served with process in Florida,
though notice was sent by registered mail to it in Delaware. The
Florida action had been brought to determine whether the proceeds
of the Delaware trust passed by inter vivos appointment or instead
passed through a Florida testator's will. The Court, speaking through
Chief Justice Warren, held that there could be no in rem jurisdiction
of the Florida court with regard to this Delaware trust, since the
corpus of the trust was unquestionably in Delaware, not in Florida,
and to assert in rem jurisdiction over a res that is outside the borders
of the forum state violates due process of law. Moreover, there was
no jurisdiction over the person of the absent trustee since it did not
have sufficient affiliation with the State of Florida to empower Flor-
ida's courts to exercise in personam jurisdiction.
" See, Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
357 U.S. 235 (1957).
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Would the holding of Hanson preclude an ante-mortem declara-
tory proceeding insofar as it determined the rights of nonresidents
who had no other affiliation with the forum state? The procedure for
the determination of testamentary capacity, and related issues herein
proposed, would eliminate the right of intestate successors and the
beneficiaries to challenge the will on these issues after the death of
the testator. It does seem that the state's interest in such a proceeding
would be the basis for jurisdiction to serve nonresident beneficiaries,
just as it was in Mullane. How can one distinguish this from Hanson
where the nonresident trustee was held not to have sufficient contacts
with the state to subject it to in rem or in personam jurisdiction? The
answer seems simple. In Hanson the transaction in question, at least
in the eyes of the Court's majority, was the validity of a Delaware
trust. The trust agreement was entered into when the settlor was a
resident of Pennsylvania. The res was in Delaware. Even though the
issue of its validity arose in the context of a Florida probate proceed-
ing, the probate jurisdiction did not and should not have given the
Florida court authority to reach out and interfere with parties and
transactions which had had no substantial connection with Florida."
Very different is the proposed ante-mortem probate proceeding. The
contact of the will of the testator is with the forum state." Even
though the proceeding cannot be characterized as an in rem proceed-
ing, and presently there is no res to distribute, the crucial issue is the
place with which the transaction has substantial contact." This hap-
pens also to be the state whose forum is convenient, whose laws ought
to be applied to determine the issues, and whose interest ought to be
sufficient to obtain jurisdiction over indispensable parties, which the
intestate successors and beneficiaries would be. All these factors,
which arguably are the bases of in personam jurisdiction,42 would
coincide in the state which has provided for such a proceeding.
If the proceeding were important and useful enough, this would
be the jurisdictional nexus-not whether the nonresident intestate
"' See the analysis by Prof. Scott in A. Scott, Hanson v. Denckla, 72 HARV. L. REv. 695
(1959).
4' Cf McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), in which the court upheld
the assertion of in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident insurance company on the basis of
a single insurance contract reissued in California. There Justice Black based his holding on the
fact that the contract had sufficient contact with California for its courts to be able to assert
jurisdiction to enforce it.
" Id.
' See Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L. REv. 657 (1959).
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successors and beneficiaries had ever set foot in the forum state or
done business there. It must be remembered that no obligation owed
by the nonresidents would be determined by the proceeding-as may
have been true of Hanson. Rather, the validity of the will would be
settled once and for all. A worthy purpose. Of course the proceeding
would have to provide for a method of notification that comported
with due process of law. Mailed notice to those whose addresses were
known and whose interests could presently be ascertained, would be
sufficient to meet this requirement." Publication would suffice for
those parties whose addresses were unknown or whose interest could
not presently be ascertained."
And even if, arguendo, it were conceded that nonresidents could
not be bound by the proceeding herein envisioned, that would not be
a barrier to binding residents of the state. They are presumed to have
sufficient contact with the state for jurisdictional purposes." And in
many, if not most cases, the beneficiaries of testator's will as well as
intestate successors would reside in the same state as the testator.
Thus even if nonresidents could not constitutionally be bound by the
procedure, still its existence would cut post-mortem will challenges
to a minimum-also a worthy purpose.
VI.
How would an ante-mortem declaratory judgment proceeding
compare with existing will validation procedures in the various states?
State practices, which vary greatly,46 can best be understood in terms
of their historical precursors. At common law there were two types
of probate-"probate in the common form" and "probate in the
solemn form."47 Probate in the common form was essentially nonad-
versary, in rem in character, and with no provision for notice to
interested persons. Basically it was an administrative procedure for
accepting a will offered by the executor or administrator, authorizing
him to distribute the estate. It was inexpensive and well suited to the
usual situation where no challenge was likely to be made to the will's
validity. Probate in the solemn form was an adversary proceeding,
11 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
4 Id.
" See Millikin v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Annot., 132 A.L.R. 1357 (1940).
U The classic description of the various state practices is found in Simes, The Function of
Will Contests, 44 MICH. L. REV. 503 (1946).
41 Id.; T. ATKINsoN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF WILLS, § 93 (2d ed. 1953).
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according notice to all interested persons, which could be brought
even long after the will had been admitted to probate in the common
form, or instead of a probate in the common form.48
The state legislatures in this country drew on the English model,
but added a variety of arbitrary distinctions, sometimes resulting in
clumsy and unnecessarily repetitious procedure. In many states the
will is offered for probate, either in a specialized probate court, or in
some other trial court, in a proceeding resembling the English pro-
bate in the common form. Sometimes this procedure does accord
notice to interested persons, in distinction to the historical model. But
even where there is notice provided and an adversary probate pro-
ceeding, some of these states then allow a second adversary proceed-
ing, called a will contest, in which the same issues of testamentary
capacity, freedom from influence and the technical compliance of the
will with state law can be raised all over again, with no res judicata
effect given to the initial probate proceeding. In the will contest,
notice is usually more widely accorded to interested persons, and the
procedure, although again usually characterized as in rem, has more
of an adversary character. Often there will be a relatively short time
after the will has been admitted to probate in which to bring the will
contest.49 In still other states, there is no separate will contest and
the only forum in which to challenge the validity of the will is in the
probate proceeding. 5
Ohio presents an example of inadequate procedure. Ohio law
requires notice of the probate proceeding (the presentation of the will
to the probate court) to be given only to "the surviving spouse and
to the persons known to the applicant to be residents of the state who
would be entitled to inherit from the testator . .. if he had died
intestate." 51 Thus notice, even by publication, is not required to be
given to nonresidents or to residents who are unknown to the appli-
cant,51-1 (who is usually, but not necessarily, the executor of the
estate). The proceeding is largely nonadversary. The will is to be
admitted to probate if it appears to be valid on its face.52
The adversary proceeding in Ohio, the will contest, is brought
48 Id.
jg Simes, supra note 46.
, Id.
5, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.13 (Page Supp. 1975).
',. In re Will of Elvin, 146 Ohio St. 448, 66 N.E.2d 629 (1946).
52 Id.; In re Estate of Lyons, 166 Ohio St. 207, 141 N.E.2d 151 (1957).
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today53 in the probate court by a person "interested in a will or
codicil admitted to probate in the probate court . . . ."I' The will
contest must be brought within four months55 of the time the will is
admitted to probate. The Ohio courts have held that this time limit
is not a bar to bringing a will contest by a resident of the state known
to the applicant of the will for probate who was not informed of the
probate proceeding.56 But nonresidents, even though not entitled to
notice of the probate proceedings, nonetheless are apparently subject
to the four month limitation period. The apparent unconstitutionality
of this lack of notice to nonresidents, under principles of Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. 57 and Walker v. City of
Hutchison," discussed above, was pointed out in 1958,s9 yet the stat-
ute has not been amended to deal with this. The Ohio will contest
statute requires that "[a]ll devisees, legatees, and heirs of the testator,
and other interested persons, including the executor or administrator,
must be made parties" to a will contest."0 To the extent their ad-
dresses are known, the Revised Code and the Ohio Rules of Civil
Procedure require that such parties be served by certified mail,
whether they reside within Ohio or outside Ohio.6 However, since
they are not entitled to personal notice of the initial offering of the
will for probate, nonresidents, who would be made parties if a will
contest actually were brought, do not get the earlier notification of
the probate of the will within the four month time period that might
conceivably cause them to initiate a will contest.12
Thus the procedure I suggest for an ante-mortem declaratory
judgment statute would be at least as likely to afford actual notice
to interested persons as does the present probate law of many states,
and indeed might do a better job than the law of some, such as Ohio.
As envisioned, the testator initiating an ante-mortem declaratory
5 Until the passage of Senate Bill 145, effective Jan. 1, 1976, the will contest was brought
in the court of common pleas, the state's nisi prius court.
5 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.71 (Page Supp. 1975).
"' Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.23 (Page Supp. 1975).
' See Young v. Guella, 67 Ohio App. 11 (1941), in which the common pleas court set
aside a probate decree where a person entitled to notice and known to the applicant to be a
resident of Ohio had not been served with notice of a probate proceeding.
57 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
-' 352 U.S. 122 (1956). See also Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
sl Note, 27 U. CIN. L. REv. 76 (1958).
:0 OHto REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.72 (Page Supp. 1975).
n OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.72 (Page Supp. 1975); OHIo R. Civ. P. 4.1.
'2 See note 59 supra.
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judgment proceeding would join the intestate successors who would
take in the event that he presently were to die without a valid will,
and also would join those named in the will. All of these persons,
whether residents of the state or nonresidents, whose interests and
addresses are known, would be served with notice of the action by a
form of notice which comports with due process as interpreted by
Mullane.3
But there is an essential difference between an ante-mortem dec-
laratory proceeding and a conventional will contest. Usually a will
contest must be brought in a relatively short time after the will has
been offered for or admitted to probate. At that time the testator's
intestate successors are presently known and relatively fixed in num-
ber. By contrast, there may be a long hiatus between the time of
bringing an ante-mortem declaratory proceeding and the actual death
of the testator. His wife or children may die, there may be more
children born, his parents or siblings might die. A wholly different
array of intestate successors might be in existence at the time of the
testator's death than were parties to the ante-mortem proceeding. Yet
if this new array were not bound by the earlier proceeding, the decla-
ratory action would have been entirely futile. The answer, as alluded
to earlier, is the doctrine of virtual representation64 and the guardian
ad litem.
If the interests of the intestate successors at the time of the
testator's death coincide with those who were present and litigating
in the declaratory action, the later intestate successors should be
bound. If it appeared to the court in the declaratory proceeding that
there was the possibility that because of the particular array and
relationship of the present intestate successors of the testator that in
the future there might be intestate successors whose interests would
not coincide with present parties, he should appoint a guardian ad
litem to protect those future interests. For example, the only intestate
successor present might be the testator's pregnant wife who is also
his sole taker under the will. The expected child might have an ad-
verse interest to that of his mother. The unborn child should be
represented by a guardian ad litem. If the guardian protects the
interest fully and fairly, this should bind future holders of that inter-
est.
With these devices, the differences between an ante-mortem dec-
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
" See note 29 supra.
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laratory proceeding and the present post-mortem probate proceeding
and/or will contest are minimized. The testator need not join every
distant relative who might inherit from him in the unlikely event that
all of his present intestate successors would expire before the testa-
tor's death. Rather he joins the same persons a plaintiff would in a
probate proceeding or a will contest-the present intestate succes-
sors65 and takers under the will.
VII.
In his 1933 article,6 Professor David Cavers contended that a
disadvantage of the ante-mortem probate procedure in the 1883
Michigan statute was that "it invited will contests and did so under
such conditions as to insure the disruption beyond repair of the family
participating. '6 7 And yet Cavers at the same time recognized that
often the threat of a will contest by "laughing heirs" is enough to
exact an unreasonable settlement from those institutions or persons
named in a will drawn by a testator who indeed might have been
perfectly sane and free from undue influence.6 He proposed a very
different solution to the problem, resembling procedures on the Con-
tinent-a proceeding before an officer of the probate court at which
a testator would present his will accompanied by a statement setting
forth his heirs and next-of-kin, together with affidavits from testa-
tor's counsel and from several other witnesses containing their opin-
ions as to the testamentary freedom and capacity of the testator. The
testator would then be examined by the officer. The officer would
have discretion to admit the will to probate or to deny probate at that
time. If admitted, the will would be sealed and kept in the custody
of the court unless revoked by the testator. Upon his death, the will
would only be subject to attack on grounds similar to those one would
raise in seeking to set aside a judgment. "[W]ant ofjurisdiction, fraud
or interest on the part of the examining officer, impersonation of
affiants or substantial misstatements of fact (but not of opinion) in
the affidavits, might properly be grounds for setting aside the pro-
bate, in which event the will might be offered for probate in the usual
"I It now becomes clear what is meant by the language of section 2 of the Michigan statute
set out supra note 8, which characterizes interested persons as "those who would be interested
in the estate of the maker of such will as heir if such maker should at the making of such petition
become deceased," apparently an awkward way of expressing this same kind of limitation.
11 Cavers, supra note 2.
' Cavers, supra note 2, at 444.
' See notes I and 2 supra.
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manner."69
Several contemporary writers endorsed Prof. Cavers' pro-
posal.7" While his plan has some appeal, it leans too far in the direc-
tion of the denial of a reasonable opportunity to challenge testamen-
tary capacity and related issues by those who have the most to
lose-the intestate successors. Indeed, they would not be notified of
the pendency of the proceeding and could not be parties to it. Nor is
it difficult to imagine that a testator lacking capacity or under undue
influence could nevertheless find witnesses who would testify to the
soundness of his or her judgment, particularly since these witnesses
would not be subject to cross-examination by counsel for adverse
interests. Prof. Cavers likens the collateral attack that he would allow
on the grant of probate to a living testator to that permitted upon a
default judgment. But a default judgment is only valid if there was
an attempt to serve parties by a method reasonably calculated to
afford actual notice.71 Prof. Cavers' procedure accords no notice to
interested persons to begin with. The procedure before an officer of
the court resembles the modern provisions in the Uniform Probate
Code for the self-proved will and for deposit of a will with the court
in the testator's lifetime, 2 coupled with an examination by an officer
of the probate court, a person who would gain expertise in the proce-
dure but would have no prior knowledge of the person coming before
him.
One well-known writer in the thirties endorsed the idea of a
judicial proceeding for ante-mortem probate along the lines I have
envisioned, but without coming to grips with the constitutional, juris-
dictional and practical problems dealt with herein. 73 Indeed, I re-
cently discovered that a committee of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws once drafted a proposed
uniform law very similar in many ways to the one I have set forth,
but again ignoring many problems. 74 Apparently the work of this
"' Cavers, supra note 2, at 447. Cf. the opinion of the Michigan Supreme Court at note
16, supra.
11 See Kutscher, Living Probate, 21 A.B.A.J. 427 (1935); Kutscher, Living Probate, 15
MIcH. S.B.J. 409 (1936), also appearing in 70 U.S.L.R. 133 (1936). See also, Cavers, Ante-
Mortem Probate, Supplementary Procedure to Reduce Hazards of Testamentary Disposition,
61 TRUST COMp. 327 (1935); Letters to the Editor of the New York Times, Nov. 8, 1936, at 8,
col. 7, by R. Nichols Voorhis.
11 See note 35 supra.
72 See note 5 supra.
73 Redfearn, Ante-Mortem Probate, 38 CoM. L.J. 571 (1933). He was the author of the
then-well-known Redfearn on Wills.
11 Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
Proceedings, at 463 (1932).
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committee was undermined even before it reported to the Commis-
sioners, when objections were raised that since there was then no law
on the subject on the books of any state, the Commissioners would
be in the position of advocating new legislation rather than reforming
existing legislation.75
As far as I can find, from the thirties until now there has been
no further advocacy of ante-mortem probate, although the earlier
example in Michigan is cited in some current treatises. The idea was
essentially buried by the Michigan Supreme Court, on a rationale
which would not control its decision today.
VIII.
Suppose a state did adopt a statute along the lines I have sug-
gested. Who would use it? Obviously one who felt apprehensive about
the security of his or her bequests. This might not necessarily stem
from the omission of a "natural object of his or her bounty" from
the will. It might as often be used by an older person with a sizable
bequest to a worthy charity, research facility or university who had
no immediate family.78 That testator would have the most logical
basis to fear the appearance of some long-lost, remote and not too
unhappy heirs who would have little to lose by a strike suit against
takers under the will. 77 Of course the procedure would also be avail-
able to one seeking to assure that he can go to his grave knowing that
an ungrateful child or estranged spouse will get no more than the law
requires. Would this disrupt families? Certainly. But any more so
than would a will contest after the testator has died and can no longer
defend his sanity or correct any mistakes in executing the will? So-
ciety's allowance of disposition by will presumes that a person has a
right to choose his beneficiaries. It is his or her wealth and the law
allows the testator to make the policy choice of disposition.
Moreover it is highly likely that such an ante-mortem procedure
- Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
Proceedings, at 143 (1931).
79 Ironically, on the day I finished preparing the manuscript for this article, the newspapers
carried reports of the death of Howard R. Hughes, the billionaire recluse. He is almost the
paradigmatic user of such a statute-dying a recluse, leaving no children, but some other more
distant relatives, with the bulk of his estate presumably destined for charity. After his death,
will it not be difficult to ascertain his testamentary capacity and freedom from undue influence
on the part of those retainers surrounding the aged and infirm person? If no will is deemed
valid, state and federal taxes will take the bulk of the estate; the rest will go to distant relatives.
7 See notes I and 2 supra.
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would greatly cut down on will contests. The future "laughing heir"
is not as likely to contest when the best evidence of sanity and free-
dom from influence-the living testator-is at hand. Moreover, a
great deal of cost could be avoided by the testator asking his heirs
and beneficiaries to agree to a consent judgment. Of course such a
consent judgment would preclude a future contest by those who
signed (absent successful allegations of fraud). A question would arise
as to whether nonsigners would be bound by the outcome. Again the
doctrines of virtual representation and related concepts could be held
to bind future holders of similar interests, particularly those whose
whereabouts would presently be unknown.
It might be asked whether an addled or litigious testator could
not drive his relatives to distraction by repeatedly changing the will
and bringing proceeding after proceeding to test his sanity. Here
again concepts of collateral estoppel coupled with the grant of sum-
mary judgment would prevent repeated trials when no new facts were
disclosed. Note that the proposed statute does not preclude facts
found in an earlier declaratory proceeding from being used, under
collateral estoppel principles, in later declaratory proceedings.
I am not certain whether the testator should be compelled to
disclose the complete contents of the will in a proceeding to establish
his capacity. On the one hand it can be argued that the content of
the will has no bearing on the issue of capacity. And that the prema-
ture disclosure of the contents might cause early family squabbling,
thus discouraging the testator from initiating such actions. But the
issue of undue influence often is greatly affected by, indeed often
turns upon, the bequest that the testator has made that falls outside
the "natural objects of his bounty." It seems hard to deny vital
evidence to the opponents of the testator, often disinherited family
members who would be precluded from challenging the will after an
ante-mortem proceeding had been successfully brought. On balance
I would favor disclosure, at least through discovery devices if not by
attachment of the will to the initial pleading of the testator.
Finally, of course, the question becomes one of policy to be
resolved by the legislature. We have not had enough experience to
evaluate how such a procedure would work in practice. Until we try,
we cannot be sure whether -society would be benefited by such an
ante-mortem procedure. In any event, we should discuss the issue and
not let it remain dormant for the wrong reasons.
